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InTroDucTIon
In response to the Bali Action Plan’s calls for an expanded international response to climate change, the World Bank created a series of Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) to 
provide “immediate financial resources” to respond to global cli-
mate challenge.1 Since the cre-
ation of the funds last year, more 
than $6 billion has been pledged 
to CIF programs by donor coun-
tries2 and the CIFs have quickly 
become leaders in international 
climate investment, at least in 
terms dollar amount.3
The Clean Technology 
Fund (“CTF”)4 is one of the 
more advanced CIFs, and began 
providing large-scale financial 
resources for low-carbon tech-
nology projects in developing 
countries in early 2009.5 This 
article examines whether the 
CTF is an instrument through 
which donor countries can ful-
fill their international climate 
change funding obligations 
under the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). First, background for 
answering this question is provided. Then it is argued that incon-
sistencies between the CTF and the UNFCCC should prevent 
CTF donations from fulfilling UNFCCC obligations. 
backgrounD
In response to the imminent threat of climate change, the 
international community came together at the Rio Earth Sum-
mit in 1992 to create a framework convention to combat climate 
change.6 The objective of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”7 The 
UNFCCC was created to organize and coordinate efforts to fight 
climate change as well as to build political will and account-
ability. The convention’s Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) is 
the primary mechanism for the world to address climate issues 
and solutions.8 
The framework created by the convention obligates coun-
try parties to meet “common but differentiated” standards,9 a 
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compromise meant to acknowledge that industrialized nations in 
the global north are the primary cause of anthropogenic climate 
change, but that all nations have a role to play in the solution.10 
One key difference in obligations is that wealthier, developed 
nations are responsible for funding climate change initiatives 
around the globe by provid-
ing “new and additional finan-
cial resources” for developing 
countries.11 In order to facilitate 
this funding responsibility, the 
UNFCCC established the Global 
Environment Facility (“GEF”) 
as its official financial arm, 
responsible for aiding countries 
in meeting their obligations to 
the Convention.12
The Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC went into effect in 
2005.13 It is the first instrument 
produced by the UNFCCC with 
legally binding emission reduc-
tion targets and timetables.14 The 
Protocol includes flexible mar-
ket mechanisms giving parties 
multiple paths through which to 
meet their binding targets.15 One 
such path is the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),16 
which allows investment in emission reducing projects in 
developing countries to generate “carbon emission reductions” 
(“CERs”) that can then be traded on the market to developed 
countries for use in their compliance with Kyoto.17
The market for carbon emission reduction credit trading 
grew exponentially in the two years after the Kyoto Protocol 
came into effect, reaching an estimated $30 billion.18 There 
are now at least fifty-eight carbon funds in the market,19 which 
purchase carbon credits on behalf of countries and private enti-
ties that cannot meet their Kyoto obligations through emission 
reductions alone.20
the woRlD bank 
The World Bank has played a significant role in the develop-
ment of the carbon market through its creation of the Prototype 
Carbon Fund21 and its extensive involvement in carbon emission 
The World Bank’s 
Clean Technology 
Fund . . . works by 
pooling donations from 
industrialized countries 
and investing those 
funds in carbon emission 
reducing projects in 
developing countries.
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trading.22 The Bank’s involvement in the international climate 
regime began with its prototype permit purchasing,23 and was 
solidified when it was selected to serve as the trustee for the 
UNFCCC’s financial arm, the Global Environment Facility.24 
The World Bank is considered the “pre-eminent multilat-
eral institution providing assistance to developing countries.”25 
Established in 1945 after the Bretton Woods Conference,26 the 
Bank has served as an intermediary between its powerful share-
holders, wealthy developed nations, and developing countries. In 
this role, the Bank provides financial assistance, technical assis-
tance, risk guarantees, and policy advice to public and private 
sector parties in developing countries.27 This history of develop-
ment assistance serves as a backdrop to the Bank’s involvement 
in climate change finance, focusing its efforts on development 
goals that are linked to carbon emission reduction and the transi-
tion to low carbon economies.28
the clean technology funD
The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund is a Climate 
Investment Fund that works by pooling donations from indus-
trialized countries and investing those funds in carbon emission 
reducing projects in developing countries.29 Through the CTF, 
the Bank focuses its financial expertise on scaling-up30 proven 
low carbon technologies by expanding them to full sector scale, 
or at least demonstrating that the technologies could be expanded 
to such a wide scale.31
The Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”), the Clean Technology 
Fund’s governing body, is responsible for approving programs 
and project pipelines, establishing project criteria, determining 
what financing products will be available, and ensuring consis-
tency between CTF practices and the UNFCCC.32 The Commit-
tee is comprised of eight representatives from donor countries 
and eight from countries eligible to receive CTF financing.33 
TFC representatives are selected by consultation with the parties 
eligible to serve.34 
The CTF is structured so that Multilateral Development 
Banks (“MDBs”) work with partner countries to develop coun-
try-specific investment plans.35 These plans incorporate CTF 
financed projects and programs36 into the county’s existing 
climate change reduction strategies. Recipients of CTF funds 
can be public or private, though private recipients must demon-
strate their place within a broader public climate change plan.37 
Once developed, projects are sent to the Trust Fund Committee 
for approval, after which funds are transferred in the form of 
grants, concessional loans, and guarantees.38 Projects are exam-
ined based on established standards, including greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emission savings,39 demonstration potential,40 devel-
opment impact,41 implementation potential,42 and additional 
cost and risk premium.43
analysIs oF The clean Technology FunD
The founding document of the Clean Technology Fund 
goes to great lengths to demonstrate consistency and collabora-
tion with the UNFCCC,44 but that consistency does not extend 
far beyond rhetorical principles. This is evidenced by significant 
criticisms of the CTF’s motives, the World Bank’s record on 
climate change, the Bank’s “technology neutral” approach to 
carbon emission, and more.45 Beneath the layers of policy dis-
agreement, even the CTF founding document46 itself demon-
strates at least three areas where the CTF is inconsistent with the 
UNFCCC. First, circular language in the document absolves the 
CTF of responsibility for ensuring “new and additional” funding 
to its recipient countries. Second, measures put in place to ensure 
equitable governance of the CTF do not achieve this purpose. 
Finally, the so-called “sunset clause,” intended to prevent under-
mining of the UNFCCC process by the CTF, is drafted poorly, 
with a major loophole that allows the CTF to avoid sunset.
new anD aDDitional financial ReSouRceS  
aRe not guaRanteeD by the ctf
Article 4 of the UNFCCC lays out the commitments of the 
party countries, including paragraph 3, which requires “new 
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs 
incurred by developing country parties in complying with their 
obligations.”47 Similarly, the Clean Technology Fund founding 
document uses the phrase “new and additional” in its princi-
ples.48 It is telling, however, that the document neglects to cite to 
the provision of the UNFCCC in which that terminology origi-
nated, despite extensive citation to other UNFCCC provisions. 
Undoubtedly, all donor countries consider their donations 
“new and additional” and intend to report their CTF donations to 
the UNFCCC as part of meeting their Article 4 commitments.49 
The CTF, however, has absolved itself of responsibility for 
ensuring that obligations are met by placing the responsibility 
on the donor country, not the CTF, to “ensure that contributions 
are new and additional resources supplementing existing [Offi-
cial Development Aid] flows otherwise available for developing 
countries.”50
Even if some of the $6 billion donated into the CIFs so far 
is new and additional, money donated to the CTF is comingled 
and combined with other sources of funding.51 This is problem-
atic because the UNFCCC reporting process requires that coun-
tries demonstrate that their individual contributions to climate 
change are new and additional.52 Under this system it will be 
difficult for a country to demonstrate this,53 and equally difficult 
for a UNFCCC body to determine whether funds are new and 
additional if they are mixed with other funding sources from the 
outset.
In the midst of confusion and disagreement over exactly 
what is new and additional funding and where the responsibility 
for it lies, it appears that the CTF has used its founding docu-
ment to pass responsibility on to its donor countries. This  creates 
a conflict; the system makes it difficult to ensure that funds are 
new and additional and demonstrates that the World Bank is 
either not prepared or not willing to meet UNFCCC standards 
for climate change financing. 
The Bank still has the opportunity to tighten up this lose 
provision by not just asking donor countries to ensure that fund-
ing is new and additional, but by requiring them to demonstrate 
that it is. In addition, the CTF could include an analysis of 
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whether or not funding is new and additional in their donation 
acceptance process, and/or incorporate new and additional status 
into the investment criteria for projects.54 This has potential to 
be complicated administratively,55 but may be required if donor 
countries are to report donations as “new and additional” to the 
UNFCCC. The CTF has multiple opportunities to ensure that 
“new and additional” funding is used, and it should do so.
equitable goveRnance iS not guaRanteeD  
by the ctf
Under the current international climate regime, each party 
has an equal vote in all UNFCCC decisions,56 ensuring that 
developed countries cannot use their superior political and finan-
cial circumstances to overpower the developing countries of the 
global south.57 In the context of financing, this was a battle hard 
fought, and won, by developing countries to ensure their equal 
say in the distribution of financial resources coming from the 
global north.58 Unfortunately, 
the CTF has demonstrated 
inconsistencies with this prin-
ciple since its creation.
The G8, an organization 
that lacks representation and 
input from developing nations,59 
made the initial request to the 
World Bank to establish the Cli-
mate Investment Funds.60 This 
means that even if developing 
countries have subsequently 
been included, they were not 
involved at the outset in deter-
mining what international body 
should house and administer the 
fund, the fund structure, or fund 
goals and objectives.
In its attempt to have equal 
representation of developing 
countries, the CTF included 
an equal number of donor and 
recipient country members on 
its governing board.61 It also 
established decision-making by consensus, allowing an unsatis-
fied board member to block decisions entirely or to abstain.62
In reality, however, the CTF governance structure does not 
involve developing countries in the decision-making process in 
a meaningful way. The consequences of this are potentially dire 
in terms of the legitimacy of CTF projects. The inconsistency 
between the CTF’s governing body and the governance princi-
ples of the UNFCCC is twofold. 
First, Membership on the Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”) 
is acquired through a “consultation” with an undefined group 
of stakeholders.63 The CTF founding document is loose in its 
instructions on the selection of Trust Fund Committee member-
ship and unclear as to how the consultation among those par-
ties should work.64 A footnote says that the “selection of donor 
country representatives is to be primarily guided by total contri-
butions to the CTF,”65 which implies less of a “consultation” and 
more of a selection process based on the highest dollar donation. 
What is more disconcerting is that no such instructions are given 
regarding the recipient country representation on the commit-
tee; the document simply instructs that a consultation will occur 
among the interested countries.66 This leaves interested coun-
tries to wonder how to ensure fair representation—or any repre-
sentation at all—on the Committee.
The first Trust Fund Committee membership selection pro-
cess took place behind closed doors at a meeting in Washing-
ton, DC in October of 2008.67 The “recipient” countries that 
will serve on the committee include Brazil, China, Egypt, India, 
Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.68 While these countries are 
vital to solving climate change, they represent emerging eco-
nomic superpowers that are unlikely to share the concerns of a 
vast number of smaller, less developed recipient nations, which 
may now have inadequate and 
ineffective representation on the 
CTF committee.
The Trust Fund Committee 
is charged with decision making 
authority regarding which pro-
grams and projects will receive 
funding from the CTF.69 This 
vital role should be given to a 
body that equitably represents 
all parties involved.70 The cur-
rent system does not guarantee 
fairness or equity in selection 
for the Committee and is incon-
sistent with the UNFCCC’s 
principles of equity.71 
The World Bank should 
clarify the founding docu-
ment’s language that lays out 
the involved parties and defines 
“consultation.” Alternatively, the 
Bank should give more power 
to the “Partnership Forum,” a 
body established to encourage 
dialogue about the Climate Investment Funds among diverse 
interested parties.72 The role of the forum could be increases 
to something more like the UN’s Global Environment Facility 
(“GEF”) Assembly, which has some decision-making power 
over GEF activities.73 Involving more stakeholders in actual 
decision-making, beyond the current Partnership Forum role of 
“dialogue and consultation,”74 would create a model much more 
in line with the principles of the UNFCCC.75
Second, the committee is given little, if any, real power. The 
board of the World Bank maintains control over all actions of the 
bank, potentially including actions of the CTF as well.76 In addi-
tion, the MDBs maintain implementing power over CTF projects 
after the TFC approves them,77 and the CTF founding document 
provides only weak language to ensure that consistency with the 
It is vital that the UN find 
ways to make sure that 
even non-UN programs 
that are working towards 
climate change goals  
meet the necessary 
standards of quality and 
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UNFCCC is maintained outside the scope of Trust Fund Com-
mittee responsibilities.78
The Trust Fund Committee is affirmatively given some 
power over the Multilateral Development Banks that admin-
ister CTF projects: it is charged 
with “ensuring monitoring and 
periodic independent evalua-
tion of performance and finan-
cial accountability of MDBs.”79 
The CTF document also, how-
ever, specifies that MDBs “rely 
on their own policies and proce-
dures in developing and manag-
ing activities the [CTF] funds will 
finance,”80 including fiduciary 
standards and environmental and 
social safeguards.81 This structure 
implies that projects voted on by 
the Trust Fund Committee will be 
passed down to MDB boards to 
control.
The CTF should ensure separation between the CTF’s 
Trust Fund Committee and the World Bank Board by making it 
explicitly clear how the CTF’s decisions might, or might not, be 
subject to oversight from the World Bank Board and the Boards 
of the MDBs. This would bring the actual practices at the World 
Bank into compliance with the CTF’s claims of Trust Fund Com-
mittee leadership.82 In addition, the CTF founding documents 
should set firm guidelines for MDB administration of projects 
and should require MDBs to incorporate UNFCCC principles 
into their standards and into their reporting to the Trust Fund 
Committee.
the ctf SunSet clauSe DoeS not effectively 
pRevent unDeRmining of the unfccc pRoceSS
The World Bank calls the CTF an “interim measure” to 
provide funding for climate change projects during the negotia-
tions of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.83 The Bank claims 
that the CTF’s “sunset clause”84 is sufficient to limit it to this 
temporary goal and prevent diversion from or preemption of 
UNFCCC negotiations.85 However, diversion and preemption 
are possible if the CTF operates as a parallel structure to already 
existing UNFCCC mechanisms, and in so doing creates a chan-
nel for climate related financing to bypass existing mechanisms 
and flow through the CTF instead.86 The idea of having a sun-
set for the Fund after its “interim” purpose has been served is a 
logical way to prevent this potential problem. The language of 
the actual sunset clause, however, lacks a guaranteed ending for 
the fund. A built-in loophole allows the CTF to remain opera-
tional if UNFCCC negotiations so indicate, thus rendering the 
clause ineffective and creating a strong incentive for heavy Bank 
involvement in the UN negotiations.87 
The sunset clause states that “if the outcome of the UNFCCC 
negotiations so indicates, the Trust Fund Committee . . . may 
take necessary steps to continue the operations of the CTF.”88 
On its face, then, it appears to offer up the CTF’s fate to the 
UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties, but this language is prob-
lematic. The World Bank will have strong motivation to ensure 
that the UNFCCC negotiations leave room for the CTF to con-
tinue. This motivation comes 
from the Bank’s pronounced 
desire to be at the forefront of 
climate change funding and 
carbon finance. The Bank also 
has a strong case to make—the 
CTF has already demonstrated 
interest from big league donors 
to the tune of over $6 billion,89 
a number no doubt envied by 
other players in the climate 
change field.90 
The sunset clause loop-
hole leaves room for the Bank 
to use its clout to keep the CTF 
alive.91 It is unclear that the 
CoP will be able to take strong 
enough action to counteract political pressures coming from the 
Bank and donor countries, which may be fonder of the CTF than 
more regulated UNFCCC climate funding mechanisms.92 
Indeed there are strong arguments that the CTF loophole 
should remain in place to allow the Fund to continue beyond the 
current climate negotiations. Proponents argue that World Bank 
involvement in long-term projects could create market stabil-
ity because many climate change related investments occur on 
longer timelines than the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol has 
provided for thus far.93 The CTF could offer ongoing and guar-
anteed financial support for such projects. It is also predicted that 
tens of billions more dollars will be needed to finance emission 
reducing projects if the global community is going to success-
fully combat long-term climate change.94 It may be unwise to 
remove any avenue for funding from the market until that target 
amount of investment is reached. 
These arguments, however, do not change the ineffective-
ness of the sunset clause as a tool to insulate the UNFCCC nego-
tiations and do not change the possibility that the term “interim” 
was used only to make the CTF easier for doubters to swallow. 
The sunset clause was a politically shrewd addition, couched as 
a compromise, which required little concession from the Bank.
The sunset clause leaves a gap between what the World 
Bank claims the CTF does—prevent the undermining of future 
UNFCCC negotiations—and what is likely, or even probable, to 
do in Copenhagen. Even if the UNFCCC negotiations result in 
the end of the CTF, the World Bank will ultimately have gained 
experience, capacity, and connections in climate change finance 
that will allow it to continue operations (similar to the CTF or 
otherwise) in the field. It is possible that the CTF itself will 
sunset only to be replaced by a similar program under another 
name. The World Bank has successfully placed itself at the fore-
front of climate change finance with little or no input from the 
UNFCCC.
Steps must be taken in 
good faith to address the 
inconsistencies between  
the Clean Technology 
Fund and the UN 
Framework Convention  
on Climate Change.
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conclusIon
Analyzing the Clean Technology Fund governance struc-
ture and founding documents provides a broader picture of the 
international financing of climate change solutions. It is valu-
able to the extent that it provides new ideas and new models 
for future finance structures, which will need to generate and 
invest an unprecedented amount of funding in order to meet the 
challenge that global climate change presents. Advocates may 
be hesitant to endorse and foster non-UN programs, but as the 
CTF demonstrates, major donors do not feel the same hesita-
tion. As such, it is vital that the UN find ways to make sure that 
even non-UN programs that are working towards climate change 
goals meet the necessary standards of quality and integrity in all 
facets of the their operations.
Steps must be taken in good faith to address the inconsisten-
cies between the Clean Technology Fund and the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change. Efforts can and should 
come from both sides: the World Bank and the UNFCCC. The 
World Bank must show that it can play nice when international 
“soft law”95 conventions regulate its investment targets. The UN 
must manage the reality that the CTF and CTF-like instruments 
are here to stay and will have to be dealt with within the existing 
framework. 
Ultimately, the global goal is to slow climate change before 
it causes permanent damage. Clean Technology Fund projects 
will no doubt contribute to a global reduction in GHG emissions 
and an increase in low carbon economies around the world, but 
these benefits come at a cost. The world spoke with one voice 
when it established the UNFCCC, and success in the battle to 
slow climate change requires that the voice of the UNFCCC be 
respected and maintained in the international community.
The UNFCCC secretariat continues to call for a “political 
answer” to the scientific community’s increasing knowledge on 
the threat of climate change,96 and it has been asserted that the 
2009 Copenhagen negotiations may be the last chance for this 
political answer. It is vital that the UNFCCC and those work-
ing for its success learn from the current state of climate change 
finance. In Copenhagen, the CTF’s governance structure, finan-
cial success, and environmental effectiveness will each need to 
be scrutinized and analyzed to learn more effective paths for-
ward and for the UNFCCC and to generate the political will for 
the Conference of the Parties to utilize the sunset clause freely 
and based on results, without the undue influence of politics.
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